Appeals; payment of taxes admittedly owed; bond; costs.

(b) The taxpayer shall commence an appeal by filing a petition with the Georgia Tax Tribunal in accordance with Chapter 13A of Title 50 or the superior court within 30 days from the date of decision by the commissioner or at any time after the department records a state tax execution pursuant to Code Section 48-3-42.

(c) Before the superior court shall have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed by any aggrieved taxpayer, the taxpayer shall file with the clerk of the superior court a written statement whereby the taxpayer agrees to pay on the date or dates the taxes become due all taxes for which the taxpayer has admitted liability. Additionally, the taxpayer shall file with the clerk of the superior court within 30 days from the date of decision by the commissioner, except when the value of the appellant’s title or interest in real property owned in this state is in excess of the amount of the tax in dispute, a surety bond or other security in an amount satisfactory to the clerk, conditioned to pay any tax over and above that for which the taxpayer has admitted liability and which is found to be due by a final judgment of the court, together with interest and costs. It shall be ground for dismissal of the appeal if the taxpayer fails to pay all taxes admittedly owed upon the due date or dates as provided by law. This subsection shall not apply to appeals filed with the Georgia Tax Tribunal as provided in Chapter 13A of Title 50.

(d) (1) If the final judgment of the court places upon the taxpayer any tax liability which has not already been paid and if the tax or any part of the tax has:

(A) Not become due on the date of the final judgment of the court, then the taxpayer shall pay the amount of the unpaid tax liability on the due date or dates as provided by law; or

(B) Already become due at the time of final judgment of the court, the taxpayer shall immediately pay the tax or as much of the tax as has already become due, with interest.

(2) In the event the final judgment of the court is adverse to the taxpayer, the taxpayer shall pay the court costs regardless of whether the tax or any part of the tax has or has not become due at the time of the final judgment of the court.

(3) This subsection shall not apply to appeals filed with the Georgia Tax Tribunal as provided in Chapter 13A of Title 50.

(e) In an action pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code section, all questions of law decided by a court or the Georgia Tax Tribunal, including interpretations of constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions, shall be made without any deference to any determination or interpretation, whether written or unwritten, that may have been made on the matter by the department, except such requirement shall have no effect on the judicial standard of deference accorded to rules promulgated pursuant to Chapter 13 of Title 50, the “Georgia Administrative Procedure Act.” History. Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 45; Ga. L. 1943, p. 204, § 3; Code 1933, § 91A-255, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2; Ga. L. 1979, p. 5, § 15; Ga. L. 1991, p. 716, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 318, § 5/HB 100; Ga. L. 2017, p. 723, § 3/HB 337; Ga. L. 2021, p. 120, § 3/SB 185. The 2017 amendment, effective January 1, 2018, added “or at any time after the department records a state tax execution pursuant to Code Section 48-3-42” at the end of subsection (b). The 2021 amendment, effective April 29, 2021, added subsection (e). See Editor’s notes for applicability. Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2012, p. 318, § 16(b)/HB 100, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “Sections 1 through 14 of this Act shall become effective on January 1, 2013, provided that cases pending on January 1, 2013, shall continue to be governed by the law in effect on December 31, 2012, until the conclusion of the case.” Ga. L. 2017, p. 723, § 1/HB 337, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: “This Act shall be known and may be cited as the ‘State Tax Execution Modernization Act.’ ” Ga. L. 2021, p. 120, § 5/SB 185, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: “This Act shall become effective upon its approval by the Governor or upon its becoming law without such approval, and shall be applicable to all proceedings commenced before the Georgia Tax Tribunal or a superior court of this state on or after such date.” The Governor approved this Act on April 29, 2021. Law reviews. For article discussing remedies for tax illegally assessed under the Georgia Retailers’ and Consumers’ Sales and Use Tax Act, Ga. L. 1951, p. 360, § 1 et seq., see 9 Ga. St. B. J. 45 (1972). For article discussing and comparing principal means by which a Georgia taxpayer may obtain judicial review of his state tax liability with emphasis on income and sales taxes, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 309 (1975). For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 70 (2012). For article with annual survey on state and local taxation, see 73 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2021). JUDICIAL DECISIONS Bond requirement of this statute is constitutional. Lee v. Chilivis, 234 Ga. 255, 215 S.E.2d 256, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1101 (1975). Applicability. — Ga. L. 1943, p. 204, § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59) relates to individual assessments and tax digest revisions made by the commissioner pursuant to Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 1 et seq. (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 2, T. 48). It is not applicable to the commissioner’s denial of liquor license pursuant to Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103, § 8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 3-2-3). Blackmon v. Alexander, 233 Ga. 832, 213 S.E.2d 842, 1975 Ga. LEXIS 1458 (1975). State could not hold out what plainly appeared to be a “clear and certain” postdeprivation remedy and then declare, only after the disputed taxes had been paid, that no such remedy existed. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 115 S. Ct. 547, 130 L. Ed. 2d 454, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 8789 (1994). Extending time for appeal. — Assessment by the commissioner pursuant to Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 39 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-51) may not be cancelled or abated and a new assessment issued after the time for appeal has expired solely for the purpose of extending the time for appeal. Undercofler v. VFW Post 4625, 110 Ga. App. 711, 139 S.E.2d 776, 1964 Ga. App. LEXIS 748 (1964). Appeal procedure. — Trial court properly dismissed a tobacco retailer’s appeal of a decision of the Georgia Tax Tribunal that the retailer owed unpaid taxes as the general intention behind the creation of the Tribunal did not permit the court to ignore the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 48-11-18 concerning the designated appellate forum available to tobacco tax payers. Moosa Co. LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 353 Ga. App. 429, 838 S.E.2d 108, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 14 (2020), cert. denied, No. S20C0816, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 679 (Ga. Aug. 24, 2020). Modification of commissioner’s original order. — When the commissioner modifies original executive order in a material manner so as to be tantamount to a new determination, the modification has the effect of superseding or vacating an earlier judgment with respect to computation of time allowable for appeal under this statute. Nikas v. Oxford, 103 Ga. App. 721, 120 S.E.2d 677, 1961 Ga. App. LEXIS 1041 (1961). When commissioner fails to certify record to superior court within 30 days after appeal, the taxpayer should not be penalized because of the commissioner’s neglect, and the taxpayer’s appeal should not be dismissed. State Bd. of Equalization v. Pineland Tel. Coop., 135 Ga. App. 796, 219 S.E.2d 1, 1975 Ga. App. LEXIS 1829 (1975). Burden of proof on appeal. — An assessment pursuant to Ga. L. 1960, p. 210, §§ 1, 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-52) is deemed to be prima facie correct, and when an assessed party appeals to the superior court in order to contest the validity of the assessment, which is a de novo proceeding, one comes into court as a plaintiff and has the burden of proof, while the commissioner occupies the status of the defendant, who by transmitting the record showing the fact of assessment, has provided sufficient answer to entitle the defendant to rebut offers of proof by the plaintiff. Blackmon v. Ross, 123 Ga. App. 89, 179 S.E.2d 548, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 735 (1970). Presumption on appeal as to validity of assessment. — When party assessed under Ga. L. 1960, p. 210, §§ 1, 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-52) has appealed under Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 45 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59) to contest the validity of the assessment, thereby opening the door to a de novo judicial investigation, the assessment must be regarded as prima facie correct. Hawes v. Le Craw, 121 Ga. App. 532, 174 S.E.2d 382, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 1272 (1970). Effect of judgment rendered against named commissioner after leaving office. — Since cases arising in the administration of state revenue laws appear in the name of its successive agents, designated as commissioners, as provided by Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-9), a verdict and judgment against a named commissioner in the commissioner’s representative capacity, rendered after the commissioner is no longer in office, is not binding on the state. Williams v. Lawler Hosiery Mills, Inc., 212 Ga. 617, 94 S.E.2d 699, 1956 Ga. LEXIS 467 (1956). When an appeal was taken to the superior court by the taxpayer against the commissioner, and judgment is rendered approximately nine months after that commissioner had been succeeded in office by another person, nothing having been done prior to the rendition of the judgment to substitute the name of the latter as agent of the state in lieu of the former, such judgment is a nullity, and no further proceedings can be had in the cause until the parties have been made, when the case must be tried de novo. Williams v. Lawler Hosiery Mills, Inc., 212 Ga. 617, 94 S.E.2d 699, 1956 Ga. LEXIS 467 (1956). Res judicata on appeal or other review. — Taxpayer has available at least three remedial procedures for use in disputing the correctness of an assessment rendered against the taxpayer by the commissioner. The taxpayer may proceed by: (1) appeal under Ga. L. 1937-38. Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 45 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59); (2) contesting the assessment and collection after issuance and levy of execution by filing affidavit of illegality under former Code 1933, § 92-7301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-3-1); or (3) paying taxes illegally exacted and bringing an action for refund. By following any of these procedures through adjudication on the merits, the question becomes res judicata. Undercofler v. Ernhardt, 111 Ga. App. 598, 142 S.E.2d 317, 1965 Ga. App. LEXIS 1034 (1965); Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Blackmon, 133 Ga. App. 164, 210 S.E.2d 377, 1974 Ga. App. LEXIS 1001 (1974). Right of appeal as complete and adequate remedy at law. — Since the right of appeal provided for in this statute is a full, complete, and adequate remedy provided by law, the trial court properly dismissed the action seeking to enjoin the commissioner from holding a hearing on the revocation of a liquor license. Rozier v. Redwine, 211 Ga. 208, 85 S.E.2d 34, 1954 Ga. LEXIS 402 (1954). Taxpayer’s right to proceed in equity when no appeal taken. — When taxpayer fails to complain of valuations or uniformity, as prescribed by law for settling such matters, and tax digest conforming with the commissioner’s direction has been approved by the commissioner, and no appeal therefrom has been taken under this statute, it is not permissible for either the taxpayer or the county to attack in a court of equity either the individual assessment or the commissioner’s order approving the tax digest. Grafton v. Turner, 227 Ga. 809, 183 S.E.2d 458, 1971 Ga. LEXIS 851 (1971). Jurisdiction of federal court. — O.C.G.A. §§ 9-4-1, 9-5-1, 40-2-8, 40-3-6, 40-3-21, and 48-2-60 provided the plaintiff challenging the automobile “title transfer fee” (O.C.G.A. § 40-3-21.1) [repealed] with “plain, speedy and efficient” pre-tax and post-tax remedies by which a taxpayer might challenge the constitutional validity of a state tax, and so satisfied the criteria of the Tax Injunction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, so as to bar jurisdiction of the federal court. Johnsen v. Collins, 875 F. Supp. 1571, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20214 (S.D. Ga. 1994). OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Appeal costs. — Taxpayers appealing from decisions of the state revenue commissioner pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59 need only comply with the specific requirements of that section with regard to court costs; taxpayers need not pay the advance court cost deposit set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 9-15-4 and 15-6-77. 1985 Op. Atty Gen. No. U85-17. RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, §§ 405 et seq.72 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, §§ 617, 673, 674, 701, 702, 707. C.J.S. 84 C.J.S., Taxation, § 859 et seq. ALR. Right of public officer or board to appeal from a judicial decision affecting his or its order or decision, 117 A.L.R. 216. Who may complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property for taxation, 5 A.L.R.2d 576; 9 A.L.R.4th 428. What constitutes plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy under Tax Injunction Act (28 USCS § 1341), prohibiting federal district courts from interfering with assessment, levy, or collection of state business taxes, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 237.