Persons liable for taxes on property.

Taxes shall be charged against the owner of property if the owner is known and against the specific property itself if the owner is not known. Life tenants and those who own and enjoy the property shall be chargeable with the taxes on the property. History. Civil Code 1895, § 778; Civil Code 1910, § 1018; Code 1933, § 92-110; Code 1933, § 91A-1021, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2. History of Code section. This Code section is derived from the decisions in National Bank v. Danforth, 80 Ga. 55, 7 S.E. 546 (1887); Burns v. Lewis, 86 Ga. 591, 13 S.E. 123 (1891); Wells v. Mayor of Savannah, 87 Ga. 397, 13 S.E. 442 (1891); Wells v. Mayor of Savannah, 107 Ga. 1, 32 S.E. 669 (1899), aff’d, 181 U.S. 531, 21 S. Ct. 697, 45 L. Ed. 986 (1901). Law reviews. For comment on Bell v. Summerlin, 188 Ga. 648, 4 S.E.2d 831 (1939), see 2 Ga. B. J. 54 (1940). For comment on Townsend v. McIntosh, 205 Ga. 643, 54 S.E.2d 592 (1949), see 12 Ga. B. J. 205 (1949). For article surveying developments in Georgia real property law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 219 (1981). JUDICIAL DECISIONS General Consideration Persons Liable for Taxes Sale of Property for Taxes General Consideration Statute is but a codification of the rulings of the Supreme Court in National Bank v. Danforth, 80 Ga. 55, 7 S.E. 546 (1887); Burns v. Lewis, 86 Ga. 591, 13 S.E. 123 (1891); and Wells v. Mayor of Savannah, 87 Ga. 397, 13 S.E. 442 (1891). Lowe v. City of Atlanta, 191 Ga. 76, 11 S.E.2d 891, 1940 Ga. LEXIS 630 (1940). History of life tenant provision. — Latter part of this statute, referring to life tenants and others, who may own and enjoy property, was taken from the decision in National Bank v. Danforth, 80 Ga. 55, 7 S.E. 546 (1887), written by Mr. Chief Justice Bleckley. Pursley v. Manley, 166 Ga. 809, 144 S.E. 242, 1928 Ga. LEXIS 412 (1928). Who may be owner. — Owner of property must be a natural person, a corporation, or a quasi-person or entity, such as a partnership. The law recognizes no other owners of property. “The estate of A.J. Miller” is not the name of a natural person, and does not import either a partnership or a corporation. Miller v. Brooks, 120 Ga. 232, 47 S.E. 646, 1904 Ga. LEXIS 520 (1904). Section does not apply to assessments for land drainage taxes. Pursley v. Manley, 166 Ga. 809, 144 S.E. 242, 1928 Ga. LEXIS 412 (1928). Real estate transfer tax imposed is not a tax on the property as such as is the ad valorem tax which is charged against the owner of the property or against the specific property. City of Columbus v. Ronald A. Edwards Constr. Co., 155 Ga. App. 502, 271 S.E.2d 643, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2636 (1980). Instructions. — Since the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law that a life tenant is bound to pay current taxes unless otherwise provided in the deed, and such charge was not adequately given to the jury, the verdict in favor of the life tenant on the issue of back taxes had to be set aside. Clark v. Childs, 253 Ga. 493, 321 S.E.2d 727, 1984 Ga. LEXIS 981 (1984). Persons Liable for Taxes Liability for taxes on property which is given as security for a debt. — When the property owner conveys legal title thereto as security for a debt, retention of the equitable interest constitutes such substantial beneficial ownership as will render the owner liable for taxes thereon, and such equitable interest may be assigned. Decatur County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Thigpen, 173 Ga. 363, 160 S.E. 387, 1931 Ga. LEXIS 316 (1931); Anderson v. Alexander, 179 Ga. 511, 176 S.E. 367, 1934 Ga. LEXIS 324 (1934); Carroll v. Richards, 50 Ga. App. 272, 178 S.E. 178, 1934 Ga. App. LEXIS 737 (1934). Liability for taxes on notes given as collateral for demand loans. — Owner of customers’ notes used as collateral for demand loans is legally obligated to pay the required tax on intangibles imposed. Yancey Bros. Co. v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 441, 1970 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10192 (N.D. Ga. 1970). Private agreement as to liability for taxes. — Ordinarily, as between a life tenant and a remainderman, the former, as the person enjoying the property, should be chargeable with taxes, but when the deed reserves a life estate in the grantor, conveys the entire remainder to the grantees, and further expressly stipulates that the grantees should “pay all taxes,” it was evidently intended to reverse the ordinary rule of liability as between the parties, and to require the grantees to pay all taxes of every kind that might be assessed against the property during the life of the grantor. Evans v. Brown, 196 Ga. 634, 27 S.E.2d 300, 1943 Ga. LEXIS 395 (1943). Rights of parties to private agreement as to tax liability upon tax sale of property. — While the grantor and grantee in a security deed may agree as between themselves as to which shall be liable for taxes upon the property conveyed, the complete title is nevertheless subject to taxation as a whole, and a sale made in pursuance of a proper assessment and execution would divest the interest and title of each of the parties, with the exception of the right of redemption. Real Estate Loan Co. v. Union City, 177 Ga. 55, 169 S.E. 301, 1933 Ga. LEXIS 113 (1933); City of Leesburg v. Forrester, 59 Ga. App. 503, 1 S.E.2d 584, 1939 Ga. App. LEXIS 337 (1939). Payment of current taxes on land sold. — As a general rule, in the absence of any stipulation in a contract of sale relating to the payment of current taxes, when the sale occurs and the property is delivered subsequently to the assessment of the taxes, the payment of the current taxes devolves upon the vendor. Baker v. Smith, 135 Ga. 628, 70 S.E. 239, 1911 Ga. LEXIS 26 (1911). Effect of cloud upon title on duty to pay taxes. — If a previous and void sale, which was made against one without title or possession of the land, has the effect of casting a cloud upon one’s title and this has not been removed, such person is not thereby relieved of one’s duty to pay taxes. One’s remedy, if any, is an action to cancel and remove the cloud upon the title. Haden v. City of Atlanta, 177 Ga. 869, 171 S.E. 703, 1933 Ga. LEXIS 451 (1933). Life tenant is responsible for return and payment of taxes. — Life tenant, in the absence of special stipulations or other circumstances, is responsible for returning and paying the applicable taxes on the land during the period of the tenant’s occupancy, and the method of determining the amount of such taxes is by determining market value according to the yardstick laid down in former Code 1933, § 92-5702 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2). Loudermilk v. Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 155 Ga. App. 591, 271 S.E.2d 723, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 2692 (1980). Effect of death of life tenant during taxable year. — Statute, so far as it relates to the rights and liabilities of individuals, clearly does not contemplate the death of the life tenant during a given taxable year, but refers only to living life tenants. Trust Co. v. Kenny, 188 Ga. 243, 3 S.E.2d 553, 1939 Ga. LEXIS 484 (1939). Taxpayer’s liability when some but not all assessments are illegal. — If assessments made against the owner of property include assessments against some property not belonging to the owner, the owner cannot enjoin the sale of the owner’s property thereunder without paying or offering to pay the proportion of the taxes lawfully charged against the owner’s property. Haden v. City of Atlanta, 177 Ga. 869, 171 S.E. 703, 1933 Ga. LEXIS 451 (1933). Lease renewable forever. — Lessee under a lease for 101 years, renewable forever at the lessee’s option, has a right both to possession and profits, which may be projected indefinitely into the future, and is chargeable with the tax thereon. Wright v. Central of Ga. Ry., 146 Ga. 406, 91 S.E. 471, 1917 Ga. LEXIS 325 (1917), rev'd, 248 U.S. 525, 39 S. Ct. 181, 63 L. Ed. 401, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 2260 (1919), rev'd, 250 U.S. 519, 40 S. Ct. 1, 63 L. Ed. 1123, 1919 U.S. LEXIS 1771 (1919). Lease which creates determinable fee. — Lease of land to A for as long as A, A’s heirs, or assigns shall pay a stipulated annual ground rent to the lessor or the lessor’s heirs or assigns, and shall comply with the covenants therein stated, creates a base or determinable fee, and the property should be taxed to the lessee as owner. Penick v. Atkinson, 139 Ga. 649, 77 S.E. 1055, 1914B Am. Ann. Cas. 842 (1913). Possession as a basis for ascribing ownership for taxation purposes. — Taxing authorities are at liberty to assess property as belonging to an unknown owner, but not to ascribe ownership to any and every person indifferently. They can treat as the owner any person in possession when they are not able to fix ownership on anyone else, for possession is a mark of ownership. Townsend v. McIntosh, 205 Ga. 643, 54 S.E.2d 592, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 561 (1949). Taxpayer liable during inverse condemnation suit. — Taxpayer remained the legal owner of property after the taxpayer filed an inverse condemnation suit and was liable for taxes until the title to the property was delivered. Jamestown Assocs. v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 228 Ga. App. 360, 492 S.E.2d 1, 1997 Ga. App. LEXIS 1075 (1997). Reasonability of tax sale purchaser’s inferences from possession as to ownership and tax liability. — When nothing more appears, sale of property under a tax execution in personam against a life tenant passes only the life estate, but when the person named as defendant in the tax execution, that is, the life tenant, is in possession at the time of assessment and levy and sale, and it is proved upon the trial that the execution is for taxes upon the specific property only, then the purchaser at the tax sale is justified in assuming the purchaser is acquiring a fee. Townsend v. McIntosh, 205 Ga. 643, 54 S.E.2d 592, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 561 (1949). Tax deed purchaser responsible for taxes after tax sale. — Tax deed purchaser, not the church, a defendant in fi. fa., was obligated to pay ad valorem taxes that accrued after the tax sale and before redemption, and the tax commissioner could not use the excess funds to satisfy the buyer’s tax obligation that occurred after the tax sale. Iglesia Del Dios Vivo Columna Y Apoyo De La Verdad La Luz Del Mundo, Inc. v. Downing, 321 Ga. App. 778, 742 S.E.2d 742, 2013 Ga. App. LEXIS 365 (2013), cert. denied, No. S13C1430, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 829 (Ga. Oct. 7, 2013). Sale of Property for Taxes Tax sale of property in which defendant has no interest nor right to represent owner. — No property can be sold under a tax execution in personam as the property of the defendant therein, when the defendant neither has title nor possession, nor any right to represent the person who has the property; and a sale under these circumstances would be void as to the true owner. Haden v. City of Atlanta, 177 Ga. 869, 171 S.E. 703, 1933 Ga. LEXIS 451 (1933). For sale of minor’s trust property under execution against trustee, see Bourquin v. Bourquin, 120 Ga. 115, 47 S.E. 639, 1904 Ga. LEXIS 457 (1904). Procedure upon discovery that tax sale involved property in which defendant had no interest. — When a municipal corporation, after causing an illegal and void sale against one without title or possession to the land sold, discovered the sale’s invalidity and refunded to the purchaser the amount which the purchaser had paid, it then had the right to proceed in a proper manner to make an assessment against the true owner and to collect taxes by fieri facias in personam against the owner, upon the owner’s failure to return the property for taxation. Haden v. City of Atlanta, 177 Ga. 869, 171 S.E. 703, 1933 Ga. LEXIS 451 (1933). Execution and sale against life tenant passes only life estate. — When property is sold under a tax execution against a life tenant in personam, only the life estate passes to the purchaser. Townsend v. McIntosh, 205 Ga. 643, 54 S.E.2d 592, 1949 Ga. LEXIS 561 (1949). Rights of purchaser at tax sale against lessor and lessee of property sold. — When owner of realty entered into a written contract with another by which the lessee, being placed in possession, obligated oneself to pay all taxes that might be assessed against the premises, and when the lessee, rather than the owner returned the property for taxation and taxes were assessed against the lessee in possession, and when on default in the payment of taxes the premises were levied on and sold as property of the lessee, the purchaser of the premises at a tax sale acquired the property divested of the owner’s and lessor’s title. Lowe v. City of Atlanta, 191 Ga. 76, 11 S.E.2d 891, 1940 Ga. LEXIS 630 (1940). Power of municipal tax officials to issue execution in rem. — In the absence of charter power, municipal officers in charge of levying and collecting taxes are without power to issue an execution in rem against land when the land’s ownership is not in doubt. Martin v. Clark, 190 Ga. 270, 9 S.E.2d 54, 1940 Ga. LEXIS 435 (1940). Designation of owner or property in execution. — Owners have an interest in being properly designated in executions which issue for the collection of taxes upon the owners’ property, or, if the owners cannot be designated with reasonable certainty, that the property shall be pointed out in the executions as authority for seizing the property irrespective of ownership, or as the property of some particular person. In all cases of doubt, the execution should specify the particular realty on which the tax accrued, and direct the officer to seize the property or so much of the property as is necessary to pay its own taxes. Miller v. Brooks, 120 Ga. 232, 47 S.E. 646, 1904 Ga. LEXIS 520 (1904). County ad valorem taxes paid from surplus of foreclosure. — Trial court properly ordered that county ad valorem taxes could be paid from surplus proceeds obtained from a foreclosure sale of the subject property, given that: (1) the taxes were chargeable as a taxpayer’s personal debt or as a lien, extending not only to the subject property, but also to all property the taxpayer owned, and the foreclosure notice did not limit the commissioner’s authority as to how to collect the taxes owed; and (2) the security deed in turn provided that upon a foreclosure sale of the property, the lender bank would apply any surplus proceeds to the person or persons legally entitled to the proceeds, which also included the tax commissioner. Mulligan v. Sec. Bank of Bibb County, 280 Ga. App. 248, 633 S.E.2d 629, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 803 (2006). OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Property sold under bond for title. — Purchaser/possessor of a piece of property under a bond for title can be subjected to ad valorem taxation for that parcel, and once the Board of Tax Assessors chooses to assess the property against the occupant, and not the seller of the property, the occupant should receive the tax notices required by O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306, and be treated as “the taxpayer” entitled to appeal under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311. 1989 Op. Atty Gen. U89-17. Statute is not applicable in determining the extent of the homestead which should be granted to the occupant who owns a joint interest in the property. 1954-56 Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. 735. Taxation by city of automobiles used within city limits by employees of nonresident owner. — City may not legally assess ad valorem taxes against automobiles owned by nonresidents although the automobiles are used within the city by employees of the owners. 1952-53 Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. 188. RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, § 634. C.J.S. 84 C.J.S., Taxation, § 130 et seq. ALR. Liability for taxes accruing after execution of contract for sale of land and before conveyance, 12 A.L.R. 411. Taxation of chattels and conditional sale contracts or title retaining notes given in respect of them, 12 A.L.R. 566. Period covered by lessee’s, sublessee’s, or assignee’s covenant to pay taxes or assessments, 97 A.L.R. 931. Name under which property of decedent should be assessed, 119 A.L.R. 383. Right of mortgagee or other lienor to acquire and hold tax title in his own right as against persons owning other interest or liens upon property, 140 A.L.R. 294. Liability of mortgagor or his grantee to mortgagee for loss or depreciation in value of mortgage security as result of failure to pay taxes, 154 A.L.R. 614. Duty to pay real property taxes as affected by time of commencement or termination of life estate, 8 A.L.R.4th 643.